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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court recently held in Patterson v. Shumate1 that a bank-
ruptcy debtor's interest in a pension plan is not property of the bankruptcy estate
(and therefore beyond the reach of creditors) if the pension plan contains the type
of anti-alienation provision required to qualify for special tax treatment under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (hereinafter "ERISA'):2 Pat-
* Richard A. Montague, Jr. is a shareholder of Heidelberg & Woodliff, P.A., Jackson, Mississippi. He prac-
tices in the litigation section and chairs the Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights Practice Group of the firm. An
early draft version of this article was presented as part of the program of the ERISA Task Force of the A.B.A.
Business Bankruptcy Committee at its fall meeting held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges on October 16, 1992, in San Antonio, Texas. The authors gratefully acknowl-
edge the contributions of Scott Norberg, Assistant Professor of Law at Mississippi College School of Law in Jack-
son, Mississippi; Mary Radford, Associate Professor of Law at Georgia State University College of Law in
Atlanta, Georgia; Lynn Roberts, an Associate in the bankruptcy department in the New York City office of Le-
boeuf, Lamb, Leivy & MacRae; the Mississippi College Law Review staff; and the A.B.A. ERISA Task Force
members.
•* Gena R. Lentz is a staff attorney in the Jackson, Mississippi law firm of Heidelberg & Woodliff, P.A.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001). ERISA was enacted
by Congress in order to promote uniform treatment of retirement plans and to protect employees from abuses in
the administration of plans. Congress recognized that many employees and their beneficiaries were being de-
prived of anticipated retirement benefits, and found it necessary to provide minimum standards for such plans.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
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terson resolved most issues in the controversy over whether creditors could reach
the debtor's pension benefits to satisfy their claims .3 Bankruptcy trustees have bat-
tled with debtors and pension plan trustees for several years over this issue and the
circuits were divided. 4 While the Patterson case has resolved much of the uncer-
tainty in this area, there are still unanswered questions.
3. 112 S. Ct. at 2242.
4. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Patterson v. Shumate in order to resolve the conflict among the
courts of appeals concerning whether creditors can levy on pension plan assets. The Third, Fourth, Sixth and
Tenth Circuits held that the bankruptcy trustee cannot reach qualified pension benefits. See Gladwell v. Harline
(In re Harline), 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991) (ERISA constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under II
U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2991 (1992); Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991)
(ERISA constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under II U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).); Shumate v. Patterson, 943
F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991) (ERISA constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).);
Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1991) (ERISA constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991); Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d
1476 (4th Cir. 1990)(ERISA constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).). The
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits held that the bankruptcy trustee can reach the pension benefits, unless
they are exempt. See Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991) (The phrase "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" as used in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) refers only to state spendthrift trust law.); Daniel v. Secu-
rity Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (The phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as
used in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) refers only to state spendthrift trust law.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986);
Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (The phrase "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" as used in 11 U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2) refers only to state spendthrift trust law.); Samore v. Graham
(In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984) (The phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as used in 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(c)(2) refers only to state spendthrift trust law.); Goff v. Taylor (Matter of Goff), 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.
1983) (The phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as used in II U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) refers only to state spend-
thrift trust law.). See also Richard A. Montague, Jr., Are Retirement Funds Exempt From the Reach of Creditors in
Mississippi?, 10 Miss. C. L. REv. 125 (1990).
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The Court in Patterson ruled that the anti-alienation provisions required in
ERISA-qualified pension plans' constitutes an enforceable restriction on transfer
within the meaning of section 541 (c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.7 Therefore, as a
general rule, ERISA-qualified pension benefits cannot be reached by creditors.
The Patterson decision recognizes the integrity of ERISA's anti-alienation clause
and promotes Congress's expressly declared policy of protecting "the interests of
participants in [employee benefit] plans and their beneficiaries."8 The Patterson
case did not involve a fraudulent debtor. In fact, the debtor in Patterson argued that
excluding pension benefits from the debtor's estate would not prejudice creditors if
the debtor had transferred funds into an ERISA-qualified plan to hinder, defraud
5. One of the requirements that a plan must meet in order to maintain qualified status is that it must provide
that "benefits . . .may not be assigned or alienated." See I.R.C. § 401(a)(3) (1988). This requirement is often
referred to as the "anti-alienation provision." Id.; see infra note 6 for a discussion of qualification. The Treasury
Department regulation addressing section 401(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
Under§ 401 (a)(13), a trust shall not constitute a qualified trust unless the plan of which such trust is a part
provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in eq-
uity), alienated, or subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution, or other legal or equitable proc-
ess.
Treas. Reg. 1.40(a)-13(b)(1)(1985).
Title 1, § 206 (d)(1) of ERISA reads: "[Elach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan
may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
A sample anti-alienation provision in an ERISA-qualified plan reads as follows:
Subject to the exceptions provided below, no benefit which shall be payable out of the Trust Fund to any
person (including a participant or his beneficiary) shall be subject in any manner to anticipation, aliena-
tion, sale, transfer, assignment, pledge, encumbrance, or charge, and any attempt to anticipate, alienate,
sell, transfer, assign, pledge, encumber or charge the same shall be void; and no such benefit shall in any
manner be liable for, or subject to, the debts, contracts, liabilities, engagements, or torts of any such per-
son, nor shall it be subject to attachment or legal process for or against such person, and the same shall
not be recognized by the Trustee, except to such extent as may be required by law.
This provision shall not apply to the extent a participant or beneficiary is indebted to the Plan, for any
reason, under any provision of this Agreement.
This provision shall not apply to a "qualified domestic relations order" defined in Code Section 414(p)
and those other domestic relations orders permitted to be so treated by the Administrator under the provi-
sions of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984.
In re Leimbach, 99 B.R. 796, 798 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
6. An "ERISA-qualified pension plan" or "qualified pension plan" is one that meets certain requirements set
forth in the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(1988). Included among these requirements is the re-
quirement that a plan must provide that "benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." See
I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(1988); see also supra note 5. Other qualification requirements include minimum vesting
standards, minimum distribution requirements, and limits on the amount that can be contributed annually to a
plan. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(1988). If the plan satisfies the requirements for qualification, the employer and em-
ployee are afforded favorable tax treatment. For instance, the employer can claim a tax deduction for its contribu-
tions, subject to certain limits. I.R.C. § 404 (1988). The plan's earnings are tax-exempt. I. R. C. § 501 (a) (1988).
Also, employees are not taxed until they actually receive funds from the pension plan. l.R.C. §§ 402(a), (e)
(1988). These tax benefits reflect Congress's intent to provide uniform treatment of retirement benefits for em-
ployees upon retirement.
7. 112 S. Ct. at 2248. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) states in pertinent part:
(c)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest of the debtor in property be-
comes property of the estate. . . notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or
applicable nonbankruptcy law-
(2) A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
8. ERISA §§ 2(b)-(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 (b)-(c) (1988).
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and delay creditors.9 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this position in
a footnote in its opinion in this case.1" Is the Fourth Circuit right on this issue? Can
a fraudulent transfer to an ERISA-qualified pension plan be avoided? Consider the
following hypothetical.
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL
Attorney Tom Cheatham is a sole bankruptcy practitioner who has formed a
professional corporation (hereinafter "P.C."). His P.C. has an ERISA-qualified
pension plan which contains an anti-alienation clause. Mr. Cheatham is an em-
ployee of the corporation, is the plan administrator and serves as trustee of the
plan. After Mr. Cheatham specialized his practice to exclusively represent single
asset Chapter 11 debtors, he began to suffer severe financial difficulties. He let his
malpractice insurance lapse and started advertising on television for personal in-
jury cases. In his first three personal injury cases, Mr. Cheatham settled one of
the cases for $1 million, resulting in a $300,000 fee. His other two cases were
tried, and his negligence resulted in defense verdicts. Mr. Cheatham's unhappy
clients sued him for a total of $10 million. Mr. Cheatham took the fee from his
successful settlement and contributed the maximum amount allowed by law to his
ERISA-qualified pension plan. Mr. Cheatham then filed for bankruptcy protec-
tion under Chapter 7. Relying on the Patterson v. Shumate case, Cheatham listed
the contribution to his ERISA-qualified plan in his schedules but excluded it from
property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).1" The trustee filed an adver-
sary proceeding to recover the contributions made to the pension plan. Assuming
that the trustee can prove the elements of a fraudulent transfer into the pension
plan, can he recover the fraudulent transfer from the plan? 2
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT FOOTNOTE
Creditors and trustees who argued against the result reached in Patterson sought
to limit pension plan assets that would be excluded from the bankruptcy estate to
those pension plans that would also qualify as state spendthrift trusts. 3 The ra-
9. 60 U.S.L.W. 3743, 3744 (1992).
10. Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d at 365; see discussion infra part HI.
11. Since Mr. Cheatham's ERISA plan contains an anti-alienation provision, Patterson v. Shumate would per-
mit him to exclude his pension interest from his bankruptcy estate under section 541(c)(2). See discussion infra
part V.
12. This hypothetical is just one situation in which a fraudulent transfer to a pension plan could occur. The
following activities may also raise a question as to whether a debtor is acting with fraudulent intent in anticipation
of his bankruptcy filing. Suppose a debtor causes a self-employed retirement plan (which would not be excluded
under Patterson v. Shumate) to be converted to a plan which covers employees as well as owners (which would be
excluded under Patterson v. Shumate). What ifa debtor rolls an IRA account (not subject to ERISA's anti-aliena-
tion provision) into a new retirement plan covered by ERISA's anti-alienation provision? What if a debtor con-
verts an unfunded "top hat" plan (unqualified plan) into a funded plan or into a plan which covers employees
(which brings the plan within the scope of Patterson v. Shumate)? See Paul Puchot, What's Left to Recover From
Employee Benefit Plans After Patterson v. Shumate?, 8 NAB TALK 25, 27, No. 3 (National Association of Bank-
ruptcy Trustees, 1992).
13. A spendthrift trust is "one which provides a fund for [the] benefit of another than [the] settlor, secures it
against [the] beneficiary's own improvidence, and places it beyond his creditors' reach." BLACK'S LAW DIcTio-
NARY 1400 (6th ed. 1990).
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tionale for this position is that in situations where a debtor has control over his
pension plan assets, the trustee or his creditors should be able to reach those assets
to satisfy claims. This argument was rejected by the Fourth Circuit in Shumate v.
Patterson and also by the Supreme Court in Patterson v. Shumate. 4 In reaching this
result, both courts focused on the plain meaning of the language of Bankruptcy
Code § 541(c)(2) in determining that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" includes
ERISA as well as state spendthrift trust law. "
The Fourth Circuit, in dicta, addressed the concern voiced by creditors seeking
recovery from a pension plan over which the debtor has control.16 This footnote
stated as follows:
Creditors concerned that a non-alienation provision is ineffective because of a
debtor's control over a pension plan, either before or after bankruptcy, are not with-
out other means of protection. Under 11 U.S.C. § 548, a bankruptcy estate trustee
can void a debtor's transfer of property that was made in the prior twelve months and
was made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. In this way, creditors
can block a debtor in Shumate's position from actually taking advantage of his con-
trol position and depleting the estate.
17
This footnote is missing in the Supreme Court opinion affirming the Fourth Cir-
cuit. There is no mention of the fraudulent transfer question in the Supreme Court
opinion. The Fourth Circuit apparently equated avoidance of the transfer under
section 548 with recovery of the avoided transfer under section 550.18 The as-
sumption that a bankruptcy trustee can recover an avoided fraudulent transfer
from an ERISA-qualified plan apparently influenced the Fourth Circuit in reach-
ing its conclusion that excluding all ERISA-qualified plans from the bankruptcy
estate would not unduly prejudice creditors. This assumption may not be well-
founded. What role this concept may have played in the Supreme Court's opinion
is unclear, but the issue of a debtor's control over a pension plan was argued before
the court.19 Addressing the issue of a debtor's control over a pension plan, debtor's
14. See Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. at 2242.
15. See supra note 7 for the text of section 541 (c)(2). In order to reach the result that limited the exclusion of
pension plan assets to those held in a spendthrift trust, courts had to interpret the phrase "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" as it appears in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) to mean "state spendthrift trust law." Many courts, in-
cluding the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, had reached this result, relying primarily on legislative
history. See supra note 4. Justice Blackmun had harsh words for these courts in footnote 4 to the Patterson deci-
sion:
Those Courts of Appeals that have limited "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to state spendthrift trust law
by ignoring the plain language of § 541 (c)(2) and relying on isolated excerpts from the legislative history
thus have misconceived the appropriate analytical task. See, e.g., Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank (In
re Daniel), 771 F.2d at 1359-1360; Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 E2d at 1490; Sa-
more v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d at 1271-1272; Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d at 581-
582. (emphasis added).
112 S. Ct. at 2248 n.4.
16. See Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d at 365.
17. 943 F.2d at 365 n.4.
18. See discussion infra parts IV and V.
19. 60 U.S.L.W. at 3744.
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counsel contended that ERISA had "adequate safeguards."2" According to United
States Law Week:
ERISA limits the amount a participant can contribute, the development of short-
term plans, and the types of employees who can be covered, [debtor's counsel]
pointed out. Further, the attorney observed, Bankruptcy Code Section 548 allows a
trustee to avoid a fraudulent conveyance by a debtor with control over a pension
plan.21
Neither the debtor in Patterson nor the Fourth Circuit explained exactly how sec-
tion 548 could be used to recover a fraudulent conveyance by a debtor with control
over the pension plan. An analysis of avoidance of fraudulent transfers under sec-
tions 544 and 548 and recovery of fraudulent transfers under section 550 is neces-
sary to test their assumption.
IV. TRUSTEE'S REMEDIES TO REcovER FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
11 U.S.C. §§ 548 and 544 give a bankruptcy trustee the right to avoid fraudu-
lent transfers. The operative language of each section is as follows.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a):
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year
before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily -
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay
or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that
such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted ....
11 U.S.C. § 544(b) incorporates state fraudulent transfer remedies:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor
holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is
not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.
23
If a trustee is successful under either section 544 or section 548 in avoiding a
transfer, the trustee must then resort to section 550 to recover the transfer from the
transferee. In Mr. Cheatham's case, the transferee is his ERISA-qualified plan. 11
U.S.C. § 550(a) states in pertinent part as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided
under section 544 . . .[or] 548, . . . of this title, the trustee may recover, for the
benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of
such property, from -
20. Id.
21. Id. (Emphasis added).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1991).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1991).
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(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer
was made . 24
Under the hypothetical, the transfer to be avoided is the transfer to the pension
plan. Under section 550 the property transferred or the value of such property
could be recovered from the initial transferee of the transfer (the pension plan) or
from the entity for whose benefit the transfer was made (Cheatham). Since Chea-
tham has filed Chapter 7 and has no other assets, we will focus on whether section
550 authorizes the bankruptcy trustee to recover from a pension plan notwith-
standing the anti-alienation provision in Cheatham's ERISA-qualified plan. We
do not consider whether Cheatham's actions have affected ERISA qualification of
the plan.
V. SECTION 550 VERSUS ERISA's ANTI-ALIENATION PROVISION
Even though Patterson did not involve a fraudulent debtor, a reading of the Pat-
terson opinion, together with the earlier Supreme Court case Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers National Pension Fund,2" reveals some clues as to how the Supreme Court
might resolve the apparent conflict between section 550 and ERISA's anti-aliena-
tion provision.
A. The Scope of Patterson
In Patterson, the debtor was the chairman of the board of directors, president
and majority shareholder of Coleman Furniture Company.26 Shumate was a par-
ticipant in the company pension plan, which satisfied all requirements under
ERISA and qualified for favorable tax treatment under the Internal Revenue
Code.27 In particular, the pension plan contained the anti-alienation provision re-
quired for qualification under ERISA.28
When Coleman Furniture filed for bankruptcy, the trustee received approval to
terminate and liquidate the company's pension plan.29 All of the participants re-
ceived their benefits from the trustee, with the exception of Shumate. Shumate
himself had filed for bankruptcy, and his bankruptcy trustee, Patterson, sought to
recover Shumate's interest in the pension plan for Shumate's bankruptcy estate .3
Shumate moved to compel the trustee to pay the plan benefits directly to him. 2
24. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1991). Section 550 also provides for the recovery of transfers avoided under several
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including II U.S.C. § 547 providing for the avoidance of preferences.
Would a preferential transfer to an ERISA-qualified plan be recoverable under § 550? See, e.g., In re Ottawa
Cartage, Inc., 55 B.R. 371 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. E.D. 1985).
25. 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
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The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia rejected
Shumate's argument that the pension plan's anti-alienation provision was an "ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law" transfer restriction and thus could be excluded under
section 541(c)(2)." The district court ruled that section 541(c)(2)'s reference to
"nonbankruptcy law" covered only state law, not federal laws like ERISA. 4 The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the debtor's interest
in an ERISA-qualified plan should be excluded from his estate under section
541 (c)(2) since the plan contained an ERISA-qualified anti-alienation provi-
sion."
The Supreme Court, in holding for the exclusion of the pension plan, relied on
the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA.*6 In the Court's view, sec-
tion 541 (c)(2) clearly entitles a debtor to exclude from his estate any interest in a
trust or plan that contains a restriction on transfer enforceable under "any relevant
nonbankruptcy law."" 7 The Court went on to state that there is nothing in section
541 suggesting that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" refers only to state
law.38 The Court found that the plan contained an anti-alienation provision which
complied with the requirements of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code con-
cerning anti-alienation .3 Furthermore, the Court found that the anti-alienation
provision is "enforceable," as required by section 541 (c)(2).4" Under ERISA, plan
fiduciaries or trustees are required to perform their duties in accordance with the
plan, and a civil action may be filed to enjoin any act that violates ERISA or the
plan.41 The Court concluded that the anti-alienation provision contained in the
plan constituted an enforceable transfer restriction under section 541(c)(2)'s ex-
clusion of property.42
An important policy underlying the Court's decision in Patterson was the uni-
form treatment of pension assets, without regard to the beneficiary's bankruptcy
status. Noting its earlier decision in Guidry, the Court stated,
[wie previously have declined to recognize any exceptions to ERISA's anti-aliena-
tion provision outside the bankruptcy context .... Declining to recognize any ex-
ceptions to that provision within the bankruptcy context minimizes the possibility
that creditors will engage in strategic manipulation of the bankruptcy laws in order to
gain access to otherwise inaccessible funds .3
33. Id. at 406.
34. Id.
35. 943 F.2d at 365.
36. 112 S. Ct. at 2246; see supra note 7 for the text of section 541(c)(2).
37. 112 S. Ct. at 2246.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2247.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2248.
43. Id. at 2250.
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In addition, the Court stated that its decision would give full effect to ERISA's
goal of protecting pension assets."
The Patterson opinion focused on the anti-alienation provision required for
ERISA qualification.4" The scope of the decision is thus limited to pension plans
that are subject to ERISA's anti-alienation provision. The following types of plans
are ordinarily not subject to this provision:
1) Individual retirement accounts and individual retirement annuities ("IRAs");
2) Self-employed Retirement Plans ("Keoghs");
3) "Top Hat" Plans -A top hat plan is a retirement plan that provides unfunded bene-
fits for a select group of employees;
4) Government and church plans;
5) Unfunded Excess Benefit Plans -An unfunded excess benefit plan provides retire-
ment benefits for a limited group of employees;
6) Public School Retirement Annuities;
7) Severance Benefits.46
The Court's decision appears to make the anti-alienation provision the determi-
native factor in excluding a plan from the bankruptcy estate, but the Court referred
to "ERISA-qualified plans." The Court did not explain how qualification is rele-
vant to exclusion under section 541 (c)(2), nor did it define the term "ERISA quali-
fied." In using this term, the Patterson Court could have meant any one of the
following: (1) a plan subject to ERISA that contains the anti-alienation clause re-
quired under section 206(d) of ERISA, (2) a plan subject to ERISA, or (3) a plan
that is subject to ERISA and is qualified under section 401 (a) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.47 Patterson did not address the issue of whether an ERISA plan that con-
tains the anti-alienation provision but does not meet the requirements for
qualification would be excluded from the bankruptcy estate. For example, if a
debtor's contributions to a plan exceed the limitations set forth in section 415 of
the Internal Revenue Code (one of the requirements for qualification), but the plan
contains the anti-alienation provision as required under Patterson, could the plan
be excluded from the bankruptcy estate? Could a bankruptcy trustee argue that a
debtor's pension plan should be included in the bankruptcy estate because it is not
a qualified plan? The Patterson case was not clear on this point.' To the extent that
a pension plan does not meet all of the requirements for qualification, an issue
44. Id.
45. See Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992). See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
46. See Puchot, supra note 12, at 26. While these types of pension plans are not excluded from the bankruptcy
estate, they may be exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) or under state law exemptions.
47. J. Gordon Christy & Sabrina Skeldon, Shuinate and Pension Benefits in Bankruptcy 2 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAc. 719 (Nov.-Dec., 1992).
48. In a case decided before Patterson, the Tenth Circuit held that qualified ERISA plans are not property of
the bankruptcy estate. In re Harline, 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991). The court was not able to make a determina-
tion as to whether the plan was "qualified" under ERISA, and therefore remanded the case for findings on that
issue. The court did state, however, that if the plan was not qualified at the time of the bankruptcy, then it would
not be protected. Id. at 676.
1992]
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might arise as to whether the bankruptcy trustee has standing to challenge the
plan's qualification in order to reach the plan assets. 4
B. The Guidry Bright Line Test and the Call to Congress
to Enumerate Equitable Exceptions
Prior to the Patterson decision, the Supreme Court had adopted a strict interpre-
tation of the anti-alienation provision in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National
Pension Fund. SO The Guidry case expanded the Supreme Court's earlier analysis in
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., " in which the Court stated
that the garnishment of pension plan benefits is prohibited by ERISA's anti-aliena-
tion provision. 2 In Guidry, a former union official and trustee of a union pension
plan pled guilty to embezzling money from the union (not the plan). Guidry vio-
lated section 501(c) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (hereinafter "LMRDA"). Guidry filed suit against two of the three plans in
which he had benefits when those plans declared that he had forfeited his right to
benefits due to his criminal activity. 55 The union intervened, joined the third pen-
sion plan as a party, and stipulated with Guidry to the entry of a money judgment
in favor of the union. 56
The district court rejected the argument asserted by the pension funds that Gui-
dry had forfeited his right to benefits, but held that a constructive trust should be
imposed on Guidry's pension plan benefits in favor of the union until the union's
judgment was satisfied.57 The court of appeals affirmed, stating, "the district
court's use of a constructive trust to redress breaches of ERISA was proper. The
Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the inherent equitable jurisdiction of
the federal district courts."5 8
The Supreme Court reversed the imposition of a constructive trust on the pen-
sion plan in favor of the union, holding that this violated ERISA's anti-alienation
provision.5 ' The Court analogized the constructive trust remedy to the prohibition
of garnishments outlined in Mackey and concluded that there is "no meaningful
distinction between a writ of garnishment and the constructive trust remedy im-
49. Under ERISA, only plan beneficiaries, the employer, the plan administrator, the I.R.S. and the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation have standing to challenge a plan's qualification. See I.R.C. § 7476(b) (1988); see
also In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989). See supra note 6 for a discussion of qualification under
ERISA.
50. 493 U.S. at 375-76.
51. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
52. Id. at 836.




57. Id. at 363.
58. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457, 1460 (10th Cir. 1988) (footnote omit-
ted) (citations omitted), rev'd, 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
59. 493 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1990).
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posed in this case. "60 The Guidry Court stated that the constructive trust remedy is
prohibited by the anti-alienation provision unless an exception to the statutory ban
is applicable.6 1 The Court then refused to approve any generalized equitable ex-
ception to the prohibition on alienation of pension benefits.62 The Court stated:
Nor do we think it appropriate to approve any generalized equitable exception - ei-
ther for employee malfeasance or for criminal misconduct -to ERISA's prohibition
on the assignment or alienation of pension benefits. Section 206(d) [the anti-aliena-
tion provision] reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a decision to safe-
guard a stream of income for pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and
perhaps usually are, blameless), even if that decision prevents others from securing
relief for the wrongs done them. If exceptions to this policy are to be made, it is for
Congress to undertake that task.63
The Guidry Court called on Congress to identify equitable exceptions to the
anti-alienation provision rather than create judicial exceptions:
As a general matter, courts should be loath to announce equitable exceptions to legis-
lative requirements or prohibitions that are unqualified by the statutory text. The
creation of such exceptions, in our view, would be especially problematic in the con-
text of an anti-garnishment provision. Such a provision acts, by definition, to hinder
the collection of a lawful debt. A restriction on garnishment therefore can be de-
fended only on the view that the effectuation of certain broad social policies some-
times takes precedence over the desire to do equity between particular parties. It
makes little sense to adopt such a policy and then to refuse enforcement whenever
enforcement appears inequitable. A court attempting to carve out an exception that
would not swallow the rule would be forced to determine whether application of the
rule in particular circumstances would be "especially" inequitable. The impractica-
bility of defining such a standard reinforces our conclusion that the identification of
any exception should be left to Congress.64
In rejecting the union's argument that the remedial provisions of the LMRDA
supersede ERISA's anti-alienation provision pursuant to ERISA § 514(d), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(d)" 'nothing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, mod-
ify, invalidate, impair or supersede any law of the United States. . . or any rule or
regulation issued under such law' ",65 the Court stated, "[wiere we to accept re-
spondents' position, ERISA's anti-alienation provision would be inapplicable
whenever a judgment creditor relied on the remedial provisions of a federal statute
.... [W]e decline to adopt so broad a reading of section 514(d)."66
60. Id. at 372.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 376. See, for example, section 104(a) of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1433, 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1982 ed. Supp. V), where Congress mandated that the anti-alienation provision should not
apply to a "qualified domestic relations order." Id. at 376 n. 18.
64. Id. at 376-77.
65. 29 U.C.C. § 1144(d) (1988).
66. Id. at 375 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982)) (footnote omitted).
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The Supreme Court's analysis in Guidry suggests that the ERISA anti-aliena-
tion statute will prevail whenever it conflicts with ajudgment creditor relying on a
"remedial provision of a federal statute."67 Is there any difference between the un-
ion in Guidry trying to recover money stolen by Guidry and a bankruptcy trustee
pursuing a fraudulent transfer? Notwithstanding the clear language of the Supreme
Court in the Guidry case, does the nature of the remedy of avoidance of a fraudu-
lent transfer in and of itself allow for an equitable exception? 8
VI. Is A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST REALLY THE SAME AS A GARNISHMENT?
Though the Supreme Court in Guidry stated, "[w]e see no meaningful distinc-
tion between a writ of garnishment and the constructive trust remedy imposed in
this case,"6" the Court failed to reveal its analysis of these remedies. Differences in
these remedies may hold the key to a judicial solution to the problem of a fraudu-
lent debtor shielding assets in a pension plan.
Garnishment is a statutory collection remedy directed at a third party, the gar-
nishee, who has property of the debtor or owes property to the debtor.7" Garnish-
ment is generally a remedy available to all judgment creditors.71 The garnishment
procedure is governed by statute and varies with local practice, but ordinarily gar-
nishment involves the following procedural steps which are required by Mississip-
pi's garnishment statute.72 When ajudgment creditor has an unsatisfied judgment,
he can proceed against a debtor by filing an affidavit with the court to obtain the
issuance of a writ of garnishment.7" The court next issues a writ of garnishment
that is served on the garnishee.74 The most common examples of garnishees are
the debtor's employer and the debtor's bank in which he has an account." S The writ
of garnishment requires the garnishee to answer whether he has in his possession
any property belonging to the debtor.7" In Mississippi, upon service of the writ of
garnishment, a lien is created on the debtor's property in the hands of a garnishee,
in favor of the plaintiff.77 In states with this type of statutory provision, the date of
the service of the writ of garnishment is a critical date because it gives the plaintiff
a lien on the property of the debtor in possession of the garnishee.7" This is the
67. Id.
68. For an excellent discussion of judicially created implied exceptions to the ERISA anti-alienation clause
leading up to and including Guidry, see Mary F. Radford, Implied Exceptions to the ERISA Prohibitions Against the
Forfeiture and Alienation of Retirement Plan Interests, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 685 (1990).
69. 493 U.S. at 372.
70. See 6 Am. JIR. 2D Attachment and Garnishment §§ 2, 13 (1963 & Supp. 1992).
71. See id. §61.
72. See id. §§ 332-56 (outlining the general requirements for garnishment); see also MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-
35-1 through 11-35-61 (1972 & Supp. 1992.)
73. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-35-1 (1972 & Supp. 1992).
74. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-35-9 (1972).
75. See, e.g., Delta Fertilizer, Inc. v. Weaver, 547 So. 2d 800 (Miss. 1989).
76. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-35-25 (Supp. 1992).
77. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-35-23(1) (Supp. 1992). In Mississippi, "wages, salary [and] other com-
pensation" are excluded from this rule. Id.
78. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-35-23(1) (Supp. 1992).
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effective date of the garnishment action.79 A garnishment generally is binding on
the garnished property only to the extent of the defendant's interest, and the gar-
nishment lien continues as security for the plaintiffs judgment until the garnish-
ment is dissolved, discharged or abandoned.8
A constructive trust, on the other hand, is an equitable remedy imposed by
courts to prevent unjust enrichment.81 There is no technical statutory procedure to
follow. A constructive trust is remedial in nature, and can be used in a wide variety
of situations to recover wrongfully-held property. It is often imposed in cases of
fraud, where one party claims that the other party fraudulently holds property that
equitably belongs to the first party.82 The person holding title to the property in
question is subject to an equitable duty to convey the property to the plaintiff.83
The effect of the constructive trust is to take property from the defendant and re-
store it to the plaintiff. '
In order for a constructive trust to arise, there must be a res or identifiable prop-
erty which can be identified as belonging to the defendant.8" In other words, a con-
structive trust can be imposed only where the plaintiffs property is located or
where the property can be traced into other property or funds of the defendant.8"
The principle of "tracing" is an important characteristic of constructive trusts. 87 In
the case of embezzled money, for example, tracing allows the constructive trust to
attach not only to the money embezzled but to any property into which the money
may be traced.88 However, a constructive trust cannot be imposed on a third per-
79. Id.
80. See 6 AM. JUR. 2DAttachment and Garnishment § 457 (1963).
81. See, e.g., In re Seneca Oil Co., 906 E2d 1445 (10th Cir. 1990) (constructive trust imposed where oil
company overcharged customers for oil in violation of federal pricing regulations, resulting in unjust enrichment
to the oil company and its creditors); Spinner v. Fulton, 777 F. Supp. 398 (M.D. Pa.), (Insured's parents were
entitled to have constructive trust impressed on life insurance proceeds to which estranged husband held legal title
by default.), affd, 947 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991); L.P. Maun, M.D., Ltd. v. Salyapongse, 105 B.R. 464 (S.D. Ill.
1989) (constructive trust appropriate equitable remedy where former employee wrongfully acquired accounts
receivable and it would be unjust to permit him to retain the funds). See generally 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 200
(1992) (discussing circumstances for imposing constructive trust).
82. See, e.g., Matter of Carolin Paxson Advertising, Inc., 938 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1991) (Constructive trust
may be imposed when one acquires property by fraudulent means.); Spinner v. Fulton, 777 F. Supp. 398 (M.D.
Pa. 1991) (Constructive trust may be imposed when facts show fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake or
breach of confidential relationship, resulting in unjust enrichment.), affid, 947 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991); MDO
Dev. Corp. v. Kelly, 726 E Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (constructive trust imposed on land and residence that
were purchased and constructed with embezzled funds), amend, denied, 735 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See
generally 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 201 (1992) (discussing circumstances for imposing constructive trust).
83. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1988) ("To prevent. . . unjust enrichment an equi-
table duty to convey the property is imposed upon [the person holding title to the property.]").
84. See id. "In most cases where a constructive trust is imposed the result is to restore to the plaintiff property
of which he has been unjustly deprived.
85. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1988); see also 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 207
(1992).
86. See 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 207 (1992).
87. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 4.3, 5.16 (1973).
88. Id. If the defendant uses the embezzled money to buy land, the plaintiff may impress a constructive trust
on the land so as to require the conveyance back to him. Id. See, e.g., MDO Dev. Corp. v. Kelly, 726 F Supp. at
79 (constructive trust imposed on land and residence that were purchased and constructed with embezzled
funds).
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son who is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of the circumstances
surrounding the wrongful conduct.89 If the property is transferred to a bona fide
purchaser for value, the constructive trust is ordinarily cut off.9'
A constructive trust can take effect at the time the wrongful act occurs. 91 Con-
ceptually, there is uncertainty as to whether the constructive trust arises at the time
of the fraud or wrongful act or whether it arises when it is imposed by the court,
but then relates back to the time of the wrong. 92 Nevertheless, under either theory
the effective date of the constructive trust is the date of the wrong." Courts of eq-
uity have the power to undo a wrong from its inception. 4 In the case of a fraudu-
lent transfer, a constructive trust is an appropriate remedy that may be imposed as
a matter of state law,95 and therefore the constructive trust remedy is available to a
bankruptcy trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 544.9"
In contrast to a constructive trust, a garnishment action does not relate back to
an earlier date. A garnishment takes effect only after a writ of garnishment has
been entered.9 7 The possibility that a constructive trust can arise from the date of a
fraudulent transfer may be the "meaningful distinction" between constructive trust
and a garnishment that would allow an equitable exception to the ERISA anti-ali-
enation rule if a transfer to a plan is avoided as fraudulent. The trust follows the
debtor's identifiable property. Theoretically, the debtor's pension assets, if fraudu-
lently transferred, would be subject to the trust. If the debtor conveys assets to his
pension plan that he holds in an express trust for the benefit of another, would the
holding in Guidry require the holding that the beneficiaries of the trust cannot re-
cover their benefits? 98
VII. A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
If we take the Supreme Court at its word, it may be necessary for Congress to
create an exception to the anti-alienation rule to provide for the recovery of fraudu-
89. See 76 Am. JUR. 2D Trusts § 207 (1992).
90. See 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 311 (1992).
91. See In re Seneca Oil Co., 906 F.2d at 1445; Meyer v. Kneip, 457 N.W.2d 463 (S.D. 1990); Pioneer Annu-
ity Life Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Equity Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 550 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
92. 906 F.2d at 1453 ("There is some dispute conceptually whether a constructive trust arises at the time of
the wrongful act or whether it arises only at the time it is so declared by the court, but then applied retroactively
to the time of the wrongful act.").
93. Id. "[Ulnder either theory, the effective date of the constructive trust is the date the wrongful act oc-
curred."
94. See id.; see also Voest-Alpine Trading U.S.A. Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 919 F.2d 206, 224 (3d Cir.
1990).
95. See In re Sergio, Inc., 16 B.R. 898 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1981); Voest-Alpine Trading U.S.A. Corp. v. Van-
tage Steel Corp., 919 F2d at 206.
96. See supra part IV for the text of§ 544(b).
97. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-35-23 (Supp. 1992).
98. Recall that in Guidry, the lower court imposed the constructive trust as a remedy, notwithstanding the fact
that the money embezzled from the Union was not traced to the pension funds. See 641 F Supp. at 360.
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lent transfers from pension plans.99 One such proposal is as follows. 29 U.S.C. §
1056 could be amended by adding an exception to the anti-alienation provision.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) currently states:
Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated.100
The proposed Section 1056(d)(4) reads:
(A) Paragraph (1) of this section shall not apply to prevent the recovery of a fraudu-
lent transfer from a participant's plan pursuant to -
(i) 1 U.S.C. § 548;1 1
(ii) 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) and applicable state law;
(iii) applicable state law; or
(iv) 11 U.S.C. § 550.
Each pension plan shall provide that funds deposited into the plan in violation of (i),
(ii) or (iii) of this subparagraph may be recovered in accordance with applicable
fraudulent transfer law and state law.
(B) Paragraph (1) of this section shall not apply to prevent the enforcement of a con-
structive trust on a participant's plan under state law in conjunction with the re-
covery of a fraudulent transfer into the plan.
For purposes of this paragraph -
(i) the term "fraudulent transfer" has the meaning given such term under the rele-
vant provision in (i), (ii) or (iii) of subparagraph (A).
(ii) the term "constructive trust" has the meaning given such term under applica-
ble state law.
Similarly, the Internal Revenue Code's anti-alienation provision could be
amended. The pertinent provision in the Internal Revenue Code concerning anti-
alienation states:
"A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of
which such trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated."10 2
This section should be amended to include a new section 401(a)(13)(C):
99. The following legislative amendments are proposed solutions to problems caused by abuses of the pension
system by fraudulent debtors with actual control over their ERISA-qualified pension plans. A more exhaustive
review of the interworkings of ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code if these changes were made will be left for an-
other day.
100.29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
101. Section 548(a)(1) empowers the trustee to avoid transfers made with actual (subjective) intent to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988). See supra part IV for the text of§ 548(a)(1). Section
548 also covers constructively fraudulent transfers. Section 548(a)(2) may be used to avoid transfers made for less
than a reasonably equivalent value provided the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent, was engaged in a busi-
ness with an unreasonably small capital, or intended to incur debts that would be beyond his ability to repay. I I
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Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to prevent the recovery of a fraudulent transfer
from a participant's plan pursuant to -
(i) I IU.S.C.§548;
(ii) 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) and applicable state law;
(iii) applicable state law; or
(iv) 11 U.S.C. § 550.
In order to preclude a debtor from taking advantage of an anti-alienation clause
by shielding his pension plan from the bankruptcy trustee while he is violating
other provisions of ERISA, the anti-alienation clause could further be amended to
state:
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(5):
Paragraph (1) of this section [the anti-alienation provision] shall not apply to prevent
a bankruptcy trustee from reaching a participant's plan for inclusion in the partici-
pant's bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541 if-
(i) the participant engages in a prohibited transaction under 26 U.S.C. § 4975(c), or
(ii) the participant's plan does not meet any one of the requirements for qualification
set forth in I.R.C. § 401(a).
The Internal Revenue Code's anti-alienation should also be amended to include a
similar provision.
Finally, in order to provide a bankruptcy trustee with standing to challenge a
plan's qualification, the Internal Revenue Code provision authorizing a proceed-
ing on qualification could be amended. Section 7476(b)(1) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, declaratory judgments relating to qualification of certain retirement
plans, provides:
A pleading may be filed under this section only by a petitioner who is the employer,
the plan administrator, an employee who has qualified under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary as an interested party for purposes of pursuing administrative reme-
dies within the Internal Revenue Service, or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion. 103
The following provision could be included at the end of section 7476(b)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code:
A pleading may also be filed under this section by the trustee in bankruptcy of a par-
ticipant who has filed for bankruptcy under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, for
purposes of recovering a transfer in violation of § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code or §
544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable state law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As it now stands, it appears that there are no equitable exceptions to ERISA's
anti-alienation provision, unless the Supreme Court will modify its analysis in
Guidry. However, this analysis, which assumes no distinction between a garnish-
103. I.R.C. § 7476(b)(1).
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ment and a constructive trust, seems flawed. If a creditor avoids a fraudulent
transfer made to a pension plan and obtains ajudicial determination that the trans-
fer is avoided ab initio, the Court may recognize an exception to the ERISA anti-
alienation provision. Otherwise, congressional action is needed to prevent the
potential abuses of a fraudulent debtor with control over his pension plan.

